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A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from 
prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by 
philosophical insight is—in my opinion— the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist 
and a real seeker after truth. 
Albert Einstein, Letter to Robert Thornton, 1944 
 
Despite the tight historical links between science and philosophy, present-day scientists often 
perceive philosophy as completely different from, and even antagonistic to, science. We argue 
here that, to the contrary, philosophy can have an important and productive impact on 
science. 
We illustrate our point with three examples taken from various fields of the 
contemporary life sciences. Each bears on cutting-edge scientific research, and each has been 
explicitly acknowledged by practicing researchers as a useful contribution to science. These 
and other examples show that philosophy’s contribution can take at least four forms: the 
clarification of scientific concepts, the critical assessment of scientific assumptions or 
methods, the formulation of new concepts and theories, and the fostering of dialogue 
between different sciences, as well as between science and society. 
 
Conceptual Clarification and Stem Cells. First, philosophy offers conceptual clarification. 
Conceptual clarifications not only improve the precision and utility of scientific terms but also 
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lead to novel experimental investigations because the choice of a given conceptual framework 
strongly constrains how experiments are conceived. 
The definition of stem cells is a prime example. Philosophy has a long tradition of 
investigating properties, and the tools in use in this tradition have recently been applied to 
describe “stemness,” the property that defines stem cells. One of us has shown that four 
different kinds of properties exist under the guise of stemness in current scientific knowledge 
(1). Depending on the type of tissue, stemness can be a categorical property (an intrinsic 
property of the stem cell, in- dependent of its environment), a dispositional property (an 
intrinsic property of the stem cell that is controlled by the microenvironment), a relational 
property (an extrinsic property that can be conferred to non–stem cells by the 
microenvironment), or a systemic property (a property that is maintained and controlled at 
the level of the entire cell population). 
Stem cell and cancer biology researcher Hans Clevers notes that this philosophical 
analysis highlights important semantic and conceptual problems in oncology and stem cell 
biology; he also suggests this analysis is readily applicable to experimentation (2). Indeed, 
beyond conceptual clarification, this philosophical work has real-world applications as 
illustrated by the case of cancer stem cells in oncology. 
Research aimed at developing drugs targeting either the cancer stem cells or their 
microenvironment actually rely on different kinds of stemness and are thus likely to have 
different rates of success depending on cancer type (1). Moreover, they might not cover all 
cancer types because current therapeutic strategies do not take into account the systemic 
definition of stemness. Determining the kind of stemness found in each tissue and cancer is 
thus useful to direct the development and choice of anticancer therapies. In practice, this 
framework has led to the investigation of cancer therapies that combine the targeting of 
intrinsic cancer stem cell properties, their microenvironment, and immune checkpoints to 
cover all possible kinds of stemness (3). 
Furthermore, this philosophical framework recently has been applied to another field, 
the study of organoids. In a systemic review of experimental data on organoids from various 
sources, Picollet-D’hahan et al. (4) characterized the ability to form organoids as a 
dispositional property. They could then argue that to increase the efficiency and 
reproducibility of organoid production, a major current challenge in the field, researchers 
need a better understanding of the intrinsic part of the dispositional property that is 
influenced by the microenvironment. To discriminate the intrinsic features of cells that have 
such a disposition, this group is now developing high-throughput functional genomic methods, 
enabling an investigation of the role of virtually every human gene in organoid formation. 
 
Immunogenicity and the Microbiome. Complementary to its role in conceptual clarification, 
philosophy can contribute to the critique of scientific assumptions—and can even be proactive 
in formulating novel, testable, and predictive theories that help set new paths for empirical 
research. 
For example, a philosophical critique of the immune self-nonself framework (5) has led 
to two significant scientific contributions. First, it was the basis of the formulation of a novel 
theoretical framework, the discontinuity theory of immunity, which complements previous 
self-nonself and danger models by proposing that the immune system responds to sudden 
modifications of antigenic motifs (6). This theory sheds light on many important 
immunological phenomena, including autoimmune disease, immune responses to tumors, 
and immunological tolerance to chronically expressed ligands. The discontinuity theory has 
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been applied to a multitude of questions, helping explore the effects of chemotherapeutic 
agents on immuno-modulation in cancer and spelling out how natural killer cells constantly 
modify their phenotype and functions through their interactions with their ligands in a way 
that ensures tolerance to bodily (self) constituents (7). The theory also helps explain the 
consequences of repeated vaccinations in immunocompromised individuals (8) and suggests 
dynamic mathematical models of immune activation. Collectively, these various empirical 
assessments illustrate how philosophically inspired proposals can lead to novel experiments, 
opening up new avenues for research. 
Second, the philosophical critique contributed along with other philosophical 
approaches to the notion that every organism, far from being a genetically homogenous self, 
is a symbiotic community harboring and tolerating multiple foreign elements (including 
bacteria and viruses), which are recognized but not eliminated by its immune system (9). 
Research on symbiotic integration and immune tolerance has far-reaching consequences for 
our conception of what constitutes an individual organism, which is increasingly 
conceptualized as a complex ecosystem whose key functions, from development to defense, 
repair, and cognition, are affected by interactions with microbes (9). 
 
Influencing Cognitive Science. The study of cognition and cognitive neuroscience offers a 
striking illustration of the deep and long-lasting influence of philosophy on science. As with 
immunology, philosophers have formulated influential theories and experiments, helped 
initiate specific research programs, and contributed to paradigm shifts. But the scale of the 
influence dwarfs the immunology case. Philosophy had a part in the move from behaviorism 
to cognitivism and computationalism in the 1960s. Perhaps most visible has been the theory 
of the modularity of mind, proposed by philosopher Jerry Fodor (10). Its influence on theories 
of cognitive architecture can hardly be overstated. In a tribute after Fodor’s passing in 2017, 
leading cognitive psychologist James Russell spoke in the magazine of the British Psychological 
Society of “cognitive developmental psychology BF (before Fodor) and AF (after Fodor)” 
(https://thepsychologist. bps.org.uk/jerry-fodor-1935-2017). 
Modularity refers to the idea that mental phenomena arise from the operation of 
multiple distinct processes, not from a single undifferentiated one. Inspired by evidence in 
experimental psychology, by Chomskian linguistics, and by new computational theories in 
philosophy of mind, Fodor theorized that human cognition is structured in a set of lower-level, 
domain-specific, informationally encapsulated specialized modules and a higher-level, 
domain-general central system for abductive reasoning with information only flowing upward 
vertically, not downward or horizontally (i.e., between modules). He also formulated stringent 
criteria for modularity. To this day, Fodor’s proposal sets the terms for much empirical 
research and theory in many areas of cognitive science and neuroscience (11, 12), including 
cognitive development, evolutionary psychology, artificial intelligence, and cognitive 
anthropology. Although his theory has been revised and challenged, researchers continue to 
use, tweak, and debate his approach and basic conceptual toolkit. 
The false-belief task constitutes another key instance of philosophy’s impact on the 
cognitive sciences. Philosopher Daniel Dennett was the first to conceive the basic logic of this 
experiment as a revision of a test used for evaluating theory of mind, the ability to attribute 
mental states to oneself and others (13). The task tests the capacity to attribute others with 
beliefs that one considers false, the key idea being that reasoning about others’ false beliefs, 
as opposed to true beliefs, requires conceiving of other people as having mental 
representations that diverge from one’s own and from the way the world actually is. Its first 
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empirical application was in 1983 (14), in an article whose title, “Beliefs About Beliefs: 
Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children’s 
Understanding of Deception,” is in itself a direct tribute to Dennett’s contribution. 
The false-belief task represents a milestone experiment in various areas of cognitive 
science and neuroscience, with wide application and implications. They include testing for 
cognitive developmental stages in children, debating the architecture of human 
cognition and its distinct capacities, assessing theory of mind abilities in great apes, developing 
theories of autism as mind blindness (according to which difficulties in passing the false-belief 
task are associated with the condition), and determining which particular brain regions are 
associated with the capacity to reason about the contents of another person’s mind (15). 
Philosophy has also helped the field of cognitive science winnow problematic or 
outdated assumptions, helping drive scientific change. The concepts of mind, intelligence, 
consciousness, and emotion are used ubiquitously across different fields with often little 
agreement on their meaning (16). Engineering artificial intelligence, constructing 
psychological theories of mental state variables, and using neuroscience tools to investigate 
consciousness and emotion require the conceptual tools for self-critique and cross-
disciplinary dialogue—precisely the tools that philosophy can supply. 
 
Philosophy and Scientific Knowledge. The above examples are far from the only ones: in the 
life sciences, philosophical reflection has played an important role in issues as diverse as 
evolutionary altruism (17), debate over units of selection (18), the construction of a “tree of 
life” (19), the predominance of microbes in the biosphere, the definition of the gene, and the 
critical examination of the concept of innateness (20). Likewise, in physics, fundamental 
questions such as the definition of time have been enriched by the work of philosophers. For 
example, the analysis of temporal irreversibility by Huw Price (21) and closed temporal curves 
by David Lewis (22) have helped dispel conceptual confusion in physics (23). 
Inspired by these examples and many others, we see philosophy and science as located 
on a continuum. Philosophy and science share the tools of logic, conceptual analysis, and 
rigorous argumentation. Yet philosophers can operate these tools with degrees of 
thoroughness, freedom, and theoretical abstraction that practicing researchers often cannot 
afford in their daily activities. Philosophers with the relevant scientific knowledge can then 
contribute significantly to the advancement of science at all levels of the scientific enterprise 
from theory to experiment as the above examples show. 
But how in practice can we facilitate cooperation between researchers and 
philosophers? At first sight, the solution might seem obvious: each community should make a 
step toward the other. Yet it would be a mistake to consider this an easy task. The obstacles 
are many. At present, a significant number of philosophers disdain science or don’t see the 
relevance of science to their work. Even among philosophers who favor dialogue with 
researchers, few have a good knowledge of the latest science. Conversely, few researchers 
perceive the benefits philosophical insights can bring. In the current scientific context, 
dominated by increasing specialization and growing demands for funding and output, only a 
very limited number of researchers have the time and opportunity to even be aware of the 
work produced by philosophers on science let alone to read it. 
 To overcome these difficulties, we believe that a series of simple recommendations, 
which could be readily implemented, can help bridge the gap between science and 
philosophy. The reconnection between philosophy and science is both highly desirable and 
more realizable in practice than suggested by the decades of estrangement between them. 
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i) Make more room for philosophy in scientific conferences. This is a very simple mechanism 
for researchers to assess the potential usefulness of philosophers’ insights for their own 
research. Reciprocally, more researchers could participate in philosophy conferences, 
expanding on the efforts of organizations such as the International Society for the History, 
Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology; the Philosophy of Science Association; and the 
Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice. 
 
ii) Host philosophers in scientific labs and departments. This is a powerful way (already 
explored by some of the authors and others) for philosophers to learn science and provide 
more appropriate and well-grounded analyses, and for researchers to benefit from 
philosophical inputs and acclimatize to philosophy more generally. This might be the most 
efficient way to help philosophy have a rapid and concrete impact on science. 
 
iii) Co-supervise PhD students. The co-supervision of PhD students by a researcher and a 
philosopher is an excellent opportunity to make possible the cross-feeding of the two fields. 
It facilitates the production of dissertations that are both experimentally rich and conceptually 
rigorous, and in the process, it trains the next generation of philosopher-scientists. 
 
iv) Create curricula balanced in science and philosophy that foster a genuine dialogue between 
them. Some such curricula already exist in some countries, but expanding them should be a 
high priority. They can provide students in science with a perspective that better empowers 
them for the conceptual challenges of modern science and provide philosophers with a solid 
basis for the scientific knowledge that will maximize their impact on science. Science curricula 
might include a class in the history of science and in the philosophy of science. Philosophy 
curricula might include a science module. 
 
v) Read science and philosophy. Reading science is indispensable for the practice of philosophy 
of science, but reading philosophy can also constitute a great source of inspiration for 
researchers as illustrated by some of the examples above. For example, journal clubs where 
both science and philosophy contributions are discussed constitute an efficient way to 
integrate philosophy and science. 
 
vi) Open new sections devoted to philosophical and conceptual issues in science journals. This 
strategy would be an appropriate and compelling way to suggest that the philosophical and 
conceptual work is continuous with the experimental work, in so far as it is inspired by it, and 
can inspire it in return. It would also make philosophical reflections about a particular scientific 
domain much more visible to the relevant scientific community than when they are published 
in philosophy journals, which are rarely read by scientists. 
 
We hope that the practical steps set out above will encourage a renaissance in the 
integration of science and philosophy. Furthermore, we argue that maintaining a close 
allegiance with philosophy will enhance the vitality of science. Modern science without 
philosophy will run up against a wall: the deluge of data within each field will make 
interpretation more and more difficult, neglect of breadth and history will further splinter and 
separate scientific subdisciplines, and the emphasis on methods and empirical results will 
drive shallower and shallower training of students. As Carl Woese (24) wrote: “a society that 
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permits biology to become an engineering discipline, that allows science to slip into the role 
of changing the living world without trying to understand it, is a danger to itself.” We need a 
reinvigoration of science at all levels, one that returns to us the benefits of close ties with 
philosophy. 
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Philosophy—sometimes represented with the Greek letter phi—can help advance all levels of the scientific 
enterprise, from theory to experiment. Recent examples include contributions to stem cell biology, 
immunology, symbiosis, and cognitive science. Image credit: Wiebke Bretting (artist). 
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